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1 It is trivial that within-group tax reforms which are separately progression-enhancing can give
rise to HI overall. Just consider a population in which two persons, each with 100, are in different
groups. In group A, the person with 100 receives a transfer from a richer person, whilst in group
B, the person with 100 makes a transfer to someone poorer. Vertical equity is improved within
each group, and welfare is increased, but equals have been treated unequally. Our interest here
is strictly in reforms which preserve the tax system's vertical stance within groups. 
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Horizontal Inequity Can Be A Good Thing
Maria Cubel and Peter Lambert
University of Barcelona, Spain & University of York, England.
Abstract A switch from any given income tax schedule to a differentiated tax structure in which
two groups of taxpayers are treated differently, each still facing the same local degree of
progression, can induce an increase in welfare despite causing horizontal inequity. We demonstrate
this result in a number of special cases and make a general conjecture, the thrust of which is that
society's acceptance of horizontal inequity will be second-best whenever the government must
operate with a limited bundle of income tax instruments such as allowances, thresholds and marginal
rates.
1. Introduction
Let t(x) be an income tax schedule, where x is pre-tax income. A switch from this schedule
to a differentiated tax structure in which two groups of taxpayers are treated differently, each still
facing the same local degree of progression, can induce an increase in (egalitarian) welfare despite
causing horizontal inequity (henceforth HI).
1 We demonstrate this result at a number of levels,
beginning with the simplest case in which the welfare improvement can be secured for virtually
any two groups, but in terms of a restrictive welfare function, and terminating with the conditions
under which an overall Lorenz improvement may be achieved. We conjecture that, given any
income tax schedule, it will always be possible to secure a Lorenz improvement by taxing those
at the same income level differently in each of two mutually exclusive and exhaustive subgroups     
2 See Lambert (1993), chapters 6-7, for more on the measurement of progression.
     
3 The two types of reform have been compared from various angles by Pfähler (1984). 
     
4 See Yitzhaki (1983) for the extended Gini coefficient. 
     
5 See Bourguignon (1979). The Gini coefficient does not decompose in this way: see e.g. Lambert and
Aronson (1993).
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whilst maintaining the tax's vertical stance within each group. Whilst society's acceptance of HI
may not be first-best, it is second-best whenever the government must operate with a limited
bundle of income tax instruments such as allowances, thresholds and marginal rates.
2. Preliminaries
If t(x) is the income tax schedule, the average and marginal tax rates experienced at income
level x are a(x) = t(x)/x and m(x) = t'(x) respectively. The two measures of local progression we
shall use are the liability progression LP(x) = m(x)/a(x) and the residual income progression
RP
*(x) = [1-a(x)]/[1-m(x)].
2  We shall examine both LP-neutral and RP-neutral tax changes in this
paper. The former modifies all people's tax liabilities proportionately; the latter is such that post-
tax incomes are modified proportionately.
3  
Let µ be mean post-tax income and let F(y) be the distribution function for post-tax income.
The mean logarithmic deviation (henceforth MLD) is J = ￿0
￿￿n (µ/y)dF(y) and the Gini coefficient
is G = ￿0
￿F(y)[1-F(y)]dy/µ. The extended Gini coefficient G(v), ￿>1, satisfies µ[1-G(￿)] =
￿0
￿[1-F(y)]
￿dy. If p = F(z), the Lorenz curve is LF(p) = ￿0
zydF(y)/µ and the generalized Lorenz
curve is GLF(p) = µ.LF(p) = ￿0
zydF(y).
4 
Let A be any subgroup of the population with mean post-tax income µA. If B is the
complement of A, with mean income µB, then µ = ￿.µA + (1-￿).µB where ￿ is the proportion of
the population belonging to A. If the distribution functions for post-tax income in A and B are
FA(y) and FB(y), then F(y) = ￿.FA(y) + (1-￿).FB(y). The MLD decomposes into between- and
within-group inequality measures: J =  ￿.JA + (1-￿).JB + J
*, where J
* is the MLD for the smoothed
income distribution in which the members of A get µA each and the members of B get µB each.
5
3. Two simple results     
6 This only requires that (1+￿)µA and (1-￿)µB are closer together than µA and µB. If ￿ = ￿[µB-
µA]/µB and ￿ = (1-￿)[µB-µA]/µA, between-group inequality is eliminated entirely.
     
7 This would involve tax liabilities for B of the form (1+￿)t(x) for an appropriate constant ￿
> 0. 
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Let A be any subgroup of the population for which µA < µ, and B its complement (so that
µB > µ). It will always be possible to select such subgroups unless the income distribution is
perfectly equal. Now change the taxes revenue-neutrally, giving a small RP-neutral tax cut to
group A and a small RP-neutral tax hike to group B. Post-tax incomes become (1+￿)[x-t(x)] in
A and (1-￿)[x-t(x)] in B, where ￿ and ￿ are constants such that ￿￿µA = (1-￿)￿µB > 0. If there is
any overlap between the pre-tax income ranges for A and B, this introduces HI. It does not affect
post-tax inequality within either group, and reduces inequality between groups.
6 Therefore the
MLD of post-tax income falls. By Atkinson's (1970) theorem, at least one utilitarian SWF records
an increase in welfare despite the introduction of HI.0. As shown in Pfähler (1984), the RP-
neutral tax hike for B could even be improved upon, with a reduction in inequality JB and
therefore a further increase in overall welfare, if it were supplanted by an LP-neutral tax hike
raising the same revenue.
7 
This simple result, approving of the introduction of HI where there was none before, is not
peculiar to the MLD. It works for the Gini coefficient too, provided the people in A are 'generally
poorer' than those in B. Namely, if [µ AfB(y) - µBfA(y)] is first negative and then positive, where
fA(y) and fB(y) are the frequency density functions for post-tax income in A and B, then both the
Gini and extended Gini coefficients are reduced by the combination of a (marginal) RP-neutral tax
cut in A and tax hike in B - see the Appendix. Again, it means that at least one utilitarian SWF
records an increase in welfare despite the introduction of HI.0. In addition, the non-utilitarian
SWFs µ(1-G) and µ(1-G(￿)) developed by Sen (1973) and Muliere and Scarsini (1989) both
favour this sort of tax reform.
4. A Lorenz improvement
In certain circumstances the combination of an RP-neutral tax cut for one group and an RP-
neutral tax hike for the other leads to a Lorenz improvement overall. Suppose group A has poor
and middle-income people only, and group B has middle-income and rich people only. More
specifically, suppose that in A, a fraction q of the population have incomes vP and (1-q) have vM     
8 Assume in addition that (1+￿)vP < (1-￿)vM and (1+￿)vM < (1-￿)vR so that the tax reform
induces no reranking between groups. The condition for revenue neutrality is that (1-￿)￿/￿￿ =
[qvP + (1-q)vM]/[rvR + (1-r)vM].
     
9 The result can be generalized to allow non-degenerate distributions of low and high incomes
in A and B respectively, retaining the single middle-income value vM in both groups, which is the
source of the HI.
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> vP, and that in B a fraction r have incomes vM and (1-r) have vR > vM. Again impose a small RP-
neutral tax cut in A and hike in B, so that the incomes become (1+￿)vP and (1+￿)vM in A and (1-
￿)vM and (1-￿)vR in B.
8  The necessary and sufficient condition for a Lorenz improvement is
rqvPvR ￿ (1-r)(1-q)vM
2 (see Appendix). Thus the introduction of HI for middle-income people
whilst preserving residual income progression within both groups is unambiguously a good thing
in this simple case.
9 
The condition on the income distributions in A and B which is in general necessary and
sufficient for a marginal RP-neutral tax cut in A and hike in B to be Lorenz-improving is that
LB(FB(y)) ￿ LA(FA(y)) for every post-tax income level y : this result is derived in another context
in Lambert (1992). The condition holds in some interesting cases in the real world. For example,
it holds for the Sri Lankan money income distribution in 1978/9 and 1981/2, with A and B as the
rural and urban subpopulations, and for the UK equivalent income distribution in 1984/5 with A
as the married and B the single (see ibid). If it were found to hold between the richer north and
poorer south in the United States, for example, then progression-neutral differentiation in the
federal income tax could be recommended.
5. Conjecture and concluding discussion
Given any unequal distribution of post-tax income, it is of course possible to identify two
mutually disjoint and exhaustive population subgroups A and B such that LB(FB(y)) ￿ LA(FA(y))
￿y. For example, one could simply partition the income distribution into poorer and richer
subgroups. We conjecture, however, that more interesting partitions than this will always be
possible. Specifically, our conjecture is this: whatever the tax code and distribution of post-tax
income, assumed unequal, a choice of subgroups A and B can be made such that (a) the condition
LB(FB(y)) ￿ LA(FA(y)) ￿y holds post-tax, and (b) the pre-tax income ranges in A and B overlap.
Consider what this conjecture implies, if true. It means that however well-designed a given
income tax may be, it can be improved yet further by appropriate differentiation - carrying with     
10 The papers of Aronson et al. (1994), Lambert and Ramos (1997) and Duclos and Lambert
(1999) all measure HI by its welfare cost, compared with the HI-free alternative of smoothed tax
liabilities. 
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it some HI. Let t(x|￿) be the income tax schedule, in which the parameters ￿ stand for allowances,
thresholds and marginal rates. For clarity of discussion, define n(x|￿) = x - t(x|￿) as the implied
post-tax income 'schedule'. If our conjecture is true, then n(x|￿) can be bettered by imposing an
RP-neutral tax hike in one group, B, and using the revenue to finance an RP-neutral tax cut in the
other group, A. The post-tax income schedules now become (1+￿)n(x|￿) for A and (1-￿)n(x|￿)
for B. This reform improves welfare, reduces inequality and necessarily introduces HI. Should
governments seek out such reforms, legislating for increased vertical equity, whilst ensuring no
individual anywhere faces increased progression, at the cost of introducing HI?
The thrust of much current research into measuring HI is that, given any income tax code
with HI, a further welfare improvement can be secured by averaging taxes at each pre-tax income
level to eliminate the HI.
10 We started with the HI-free schedule n(x|￿) and argued for
differentiation, leading to schedules (1+￿)n(x|￿) for A and (1-￿)n(x|￿) for B and introducing HI.
Now, we assert, a further welfare improvement should come from averaging these taxes across
the two groups, removing the HI again! What is going on here? The conundrum can be resolved
by considering informational requirements. Let px be the proportion of those having x who are in
group A. Averaging would create a unified schedule px(1+￿)n(x|￿) + (1-px)(1-￿)n(x|￿) for
everybody, which is HI-free and superior to the differentiated structure (1+￿)n(x|￿) for A and (1-
￿)n(x|￿) for B, which has HI and is, in turn, superior to the original and HI-free n(x|￿). The
problem is that the unified schedule has heavy informational requirements; a tax code of the form
px(1+￿)n(x|￿) + (1-px)(1-￿)n(x|￿) could hardly be announced, published and understood by the
public, due to the ever-changing px, whereas a bundle ￿ of conventional tax parameters can, and
so could a differentiation parameter ￿ (or ￿). However unfair the differentiation parameter might
seem, especially to the losers, it brings an overall welfare gain relative to the original n(x|￿). In
a world where we can cope with only limited amounts of information, it can be better to have HI
than no HI. We believe that this is a new insight. 
Appendix
Let F(y|￿) be the distribution function and G(￿) the Gini coefficient for post-tax income     
11 The same result can be derived using an approach outlined by Yitzhaki and Slemrod (1991)
for the analysis of commodity tax reform, by asusming that the two regions are 'commodities' and
neglecting labour supply and migration effects. 
- 6 -
after the tax reform described in Section 3. Then F(y|￿) = ￿.FA(y/[1+￿]) + (1-￿).FB(y/[1-￿]) and
µG(￿) = ￿0
￿F(y|￿)[1-F(y|￿)]dy whence G'(0) < 0 ￿ ￿0
￿g(y)F(y)dy ￿ 0 where g(y) = ￿F(y|￿)/￿￿|￿=0
= ￿y[-µBfA(y) + µAfB(y)]/µB. If there are poorer people in A than in B, then g(y) is first negative.
If g(y) stays positive once it becomes positive, then because F(y) is increasing, G'(0) < 0. For the
extended Gini, similar steps show that ￿G(￿)/￿￿|￿=0 < 0 ￿ ￿0
￿g(y)[1-F(y)]
￿-1dy < 0: the extended
Gini is also reduced by a marginal tax reform of the kind described, if A is the 'generally poorer'
group in the sense given.
11 The generalized Lorenz curve for the scenario in Section 4 is given by
GL(öq) = ￿qvP, GL(￿q+(1-￿)(1-r)) = ￿qvP + (1-￿)(1-r)vM, GL(1-r(1-￿)) = ￿qvP + {￿(1-q)+(1-
￿)(1-r)}vM and of course GL(1) = µ, with linear interpolation in between. The ordinates increase
by ￿GL(￿q) = ￿q￿vP > 0, ￿GL(￿q+(1-￿)(1-r)) = ￿q￿vP - (1-￿)(1-r)￿vM and ￿GL(1-r(1-￿)) = ￿(1-
￿)rvR > 0. These are all non-negative if and only if rqvPvR ￿ (1-r)(1-q)vM
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